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Responding to Sovereign Funds:
Are We Looking in the Right Place?
By Wei Cui
Wei Cui is an associate professor at the China
University of Political Science and Law, Beijing.
E-mail: wei.cui@aya.yale.edu. The author is grateful to
Prof. Michael Knoll for helpful comments on the
article and discussion of the topic.

Background and Summary of Arguments
Over the past year, the topic of federal income taxation
of U.S. investments made by sovereign wealth funds
(SWFs) has attracted considerable attention from policymakers, scholars, and practitioners.1 A focus of the debate
so far is whether the existing framework for taxing
foreign governments’ U.S. investments requires an overhaul. That framework, mostly embodied in section 892
and related Treasury regulations, exempts many types of
U.S.-source income received by foreign government investors (hereinafter sovereign investors) from U.S. taxation. Compared with other code provisions, section 892
offers sovereign investors more favorable treatments
than are available to foreign private investors. While
sovereign and private investors are treated alike concerning exemption from most interest income and capital
gain on U.S. investments and are similarly taxed concerning most real estate investments, sovereign investors may
also be exempt from taxation on special types of interest
and real estate income that, if received by private investors, would be subject to tax.2 Moreover, sovereign investors can typically derive dividend income free of U.S. tax
on U.S. companies that they do not control, whereas
private investors need to acquire derivative instruments
regarding U.S. equity securities to achieve the same
result.3
It has been suggested (for example by Prof. Victor
Fleischer) that this unequal treatment of foreign private
and government investors creates an uneven playing

1
See, e.g., Press Release, ‘‘Baucus, Grassley Seek JCT Analysis
of U.S. Taxation of Sovereign Wealth Funds,’’ Mar. 13, 2008, Doc
2008-5571, 2008 TNT 51-35; New York State Bar Association Tax
Section, ‘‘Report on the Tax Exemption for Foreign Sovereigns
Under Section 892 of the Internal Revenue Code’’ 16-26 (June
2008), Doc 2008-13195, 2008 TNT 116-53 (hereinafter NYSBA
report); Joint Committee on Taxation, ‘‘Economic and U.S.
Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment
in the United States,’’ JCX-49-08 1-2 (June 17, 2008), Doc 200813379, 2008 TNT 118-13 (hereinafter JCT report).
2
See JCT report, supra note 1, at 2; NYSBA report, supra note
1, at 2.
3
Id. See also Michael Knoll, ‘‘Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign
Wealth Funds to Invest in the United States?’’ coming in
Southern California Law Review and available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1291878 (all page references below regarding this article are based on the Mar. 23, 2009, version available on SSRN).
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field among them.4 If, for instance, a private investor and
a sovereign investor are both considering a U.S. investment expected to generate a 10 percent pretax return, and
if the former investor is subject to a 30 percent U.S. tax on
the return, whereas the latter is exempt, the latter may be
able to bid a higher price for the investment because it
would receive a higher after-tax return. This tax advantage could lead to economic inefficiencies, allowing the
sovereign investor to become the preferred buyer even
when it is otherwise less competitive than the private
investor. Prof. Fleischer therefore recommends the repeal
of section 892 and recommends that U.S. tax law follow
the principle of neutrality, treating ‘‘the investment income of foreign sovereigns no better and no worse than
private investors’ income.’’5
This apparently simple case for the repeal of section
892, however, faces two important objections, both of
which have been made in recent articles by Mihir Desai
and Dhammika Dharmapala and by Michael Knoll.6 The
first objection is that it is erroneous to infer that because
A is taxed more lightly than B on a given investment, X,
that A has a tax advantage relative to B concerning its
investment in X. This is because investors measure their
tax advantage regarding a particular investment relative
to their other investment options. For example, if A is
taxed at a 30 percent rate on all of its potential investments, including X, and if B is taxed at a 0 percent rate on
all of its investments, also including X, B enjoys no tax
advantage over A concerning X (or concerning any other
investment). All other things being equal, A and B would
allocate the same amount to invest in X, even though A
pays more tax on the investment returns. This is because,
for A, X is no worse, from a tax point of view, than the
other investment options.7 In general, it is the comparative (and not absolute) advantage of an investor that
determines its competitiveness on a given investment.8
The second objection is that it is not generally true that
U.S. taxation determines the marginal tax burden on

4
Victor Fleischer, ‘‘A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth,’’
coming in N.Y.U. L. Rev. (2009) and available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1234410
(all
page references below regarding this article are based on the
Nov. 20, 2008, version available on SSRN).
5
Id. at p. 26. Further, Prof. Fleischer argues that because SWF
poses significant ‘‘geopolitical risks’’ and ‘‘negative externalities’’ for the United States, an excise tax on SWFs on their U.S.
acquisitions should be considered. See id. at Part III.B and C.
6
Mihir Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala, ‘‘Taxing the Bandit Kings,’’ Yale Law Journal Pocket Part, vol. 118, 2008 (hereinafter Desai and Dharmapala); Knoll, ‘‘Taxation and the
Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds,’’ supra note 3.
7
Alternatively, if all of the above hypotheticals hold, except
that A is taxed at 25 percent on an investment in X, then A is at
a comparative advantage relative to B on investing in X, even
though A is more heavily taxed in absolute terms than B when
investing in X. This is because X is subject to a relatively lighter
tax for A compared with A’s other options. For a general
discussion of this view, see Michael S. Knoll, ‘‘Taxes and
Competitiveness,’’ available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=953074.
8
See Knoll, ‘‘Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign
Wealth Funds,’’ supra note 3, and text accompanying note 104.

1237

COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS

foreign investors’ U.S. investments. Foreign investors
may be subject to tax in their countries of residence on the
income they earn on U.S. investments, and in those cases,
would generally claim foreign tax credits for U.S. tax
paid. If the tax rate in the home country is higher than the
U.S. tax rate, the foreign investor would have a residual
tax liability in its home country. Therefore, the marginal
tax burden on a U.S. investment may depend on the
home country’s tax rate, and changing the U.S. tax rates
may have no effect in changing the investors’ overall tax
position. Prof. Fleischer seems to have made the fundamental error of supposing that source country tax rules
are the only tax rules determining cross-border investment decisions.
On the basis of those objections, Prof. Knoll argues
that section 892 does not necessarily put sovereign investors at an advantage relative to private investors; whether
section 892 confers an advantage depends on the type of
U.S. investment being considered, what the investors’
default (benchmark) investment option is, and how the
foreign private investor is taxed by its home country.
Profs. Desai and Dharmapala argue more forcefully than
Prof. Knoll against the proposal to repeal section 892, but
make significant additional assumptions regarding how
SWFs are taxed on their equity investments in their home
countries and in countries other than the United States.
In this article, I suggest that the two objections to
repealing section 892 are even stronger than has been
recognized, in light of two considerations hitherto not
given enough attention. The first is that the application of
worldwide taxation by foreign private investors’ home
countries is a much more prevalent phenomenon than
one might suppose. At least in theory, U.S. tax should
determine the marginal tax burden on foreigners’ U.S.
investments only in a very small number of circumstances. While it’s likely that a significant population of
foreign investors illegally evade home country taxation,
this fact does not justify the pretension that they are only
taxed on a territorial basis. Not only is it normatively
questionable whether the United States should be concerned about ensuring that SWFs enjoy no tax advantage
over foreign investors who evade home country taxes,
but those latter investors can also be shown to already
enjoy a tax-related advantage that complicates the assessment of their competitiveness.
The second consideration is that, contrary to the
explicit and implicit assumptions made by the authors
cited above, there are important known cases in which
SWFs are subject to home country taxation. This perhaps
surprising fact has several implications. For one, it suggests that, despite section 892, foreign government and
foreign private investors may sometimes already bear
similar tax burdens thanks to their home countries’ tax
regimes. This strengthens the second objection to repealing section 892. Moreover, even if one continues to
believe that SWFs are somehow subject to favorable
home country tax treatments, that belief actually
strengthens the first objection to repealing section 892.
This is because if SWFs are treated more favorably on
investments in their home countries than are private
investors, but receive equal treatment on investments in
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other countries, SWFs are potentially at a comparative
disadvantage relative to private investors when making
investments abroad.
When the prevalence of worldwide taxation and the
taxation of SWFs in their home countries are taken into
account, I believe the objections to the idea that section
892 disadvantages private investors are even stronger
and more persuasive than those Profs. Desai, Dharmapala, and Knoll have put forth. But there may be a more
fundamental issue at stake. The often overlooked fact
that SWFs may be subject to home country taxation
suggests that there has been inadequate understanding of
the organizational characteristics of SWFs, and that framing the debate about SWF taxation in terms of whether
section 892 should be retained may itself be inadequate.
In several important ways — including their tax treatment in their home countries and the policy concern they
raise for the United States — SWFs bear greater resemblance to commercial state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
(that are not eligible for section 892 benefits) than to the
rest of the section 892 investors, such as foreign pension
funds. Framing the tax policy response to SWF investments in terms of whether to retain or repeal section 892
produces poor results: The repeal of section 892 would
not only hurt too many innocent sovereign investors
(such as public pension funds), it would also do little to
address the purported policy concerns raised by SWFs.
I elaborate on the foregoing arguments in the following three sections.

The Prevalence of Home Country Taxation
When a foreign investor (sovereign or private) is
subject to home country taxation on its U.S. investments,
and when the relevant home country tax rates are higher
than the relevant U.S. tax rates (U.S. tax being thus fully
creditable), the U.S. tax rates no longer determine the
marginal tax burden on the foreigner’s U.S. investments
and cease to affect the foreigner’s investment decisions.
This seems clear in the abstract. What may seem less clear
is how often foreign investors are taxed at home on
investment income from the United States, and whether
home country tax rates are higher than U.S. rates. One
may understandably prefer to be skeptical about how
foreign countries tax their residents in conducting the
debate about taxing SWFs.9 A few simple observations,
however, show that there is a reasonable alternative to
this skepticism, at least regarding private investors.
When assessing how the relative positions of sovereign and private investors are affected by section 892,
there is a question about what type of foreign private
investors are relevant: foreign individuals or corporations? Suppose we take foreign individual investors as
the reference class.10 In this case, however, it must be
pointed out that, at least for purposes of analyzing
inbound portfolio investments into the United States,
relatively few countries can be assumed to exempt their

9

This is the approach taken by Prof. Knoll, id., and by Desai
and Dharmapala, supra note 6.
10
Knoll, ‘‘Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign
Wealth Funds,’’ supra note 3, at note 171.
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resident individuals on foreign investment income. Relatively few, that is, adopt territorial systems, in the sense
the term is used by Prof. Knoll, for their individual
residents.11 For example, among the 16 largest sources of
private, non-foreign direct investment equity investment
in the United States in 2007 (which together accounted
for 93.6 percent of total investment in this category), only
Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Caribbean financial
centers exempt their resident individuals’ foreign investment income from taxation. Similarly, of the 13 largest
sources of foreign private investments in U.S. corporate
and agency bonds in 2007 (accounting for 94.6 percent of
total investments in this category), only Hong Kong and
the Caribbean financial centers adopt a territorial approach to their individual residents’ foreign income.12
If we assume that investments identified by the U.S.
Department of Commerce data as coming from certain
countries are made by residents of these countries,13 then
much of foreign individuals’ investment in U.S. portfolio
debt and equity is taxed at home. Also, given the
portfolio interest exemption, as well as the fact that the
United States has entered into income tax treaties with
many countries to reduce the U.S. withholding tax rate
on dividends to 15 percent or less, we can surmise that
the marginal tax burden on much of those investments is
determined by the home country tax rates and not by
U.S. rates.
Of course, it would be too naïve to suppose that
foreign individuals for the most part pay tax in their
home countries on income generated on their U.S. investments. The high proportion of foreign investments coming from the Caribbean financial centers (17.22 percent
for bonds and 16.12 percent for portfolio equity) could

11
‘‘A country that exempts the foreign source income of
residents from taxation has a territorial, source or exemption tax
system.’’ Id. at 11.
12
‘‘International Investment Position of the United States at
Year-End 2007,’’ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, available at http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/
2008/07%20July/0708_iip.pdf, Table M (equity investments)
and Table L (debt investments). The 17 largest sources of equity
investments are Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Carribbean
financial centers, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Singapore,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K. Id. The 14 largest sources of
debt investments sources are Australia, Belgium, Canada, the
Carribbean financial centers, China, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland,
and the U.K. Id. Relevant information about the taxation of
foreign investment income of residents in these countries can be
obtained from the BNA Tax Management Portfolio ‘‘Business
Operations Abroad’’ series. Citations to particular portfolios are
omitted here.
13
Data gathered by the IRS through Form 1042S show that
the countries receiving the largest amounts of dividend and
interest payments from the United States basically match the
countries with the largest U.S. equity and bond holdings
according to Department of Commerce data. See Sources of
Income Tax Statistics — Foreign Recipients of U.S. Income,
available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/
0,,id=96993,00.html. At least for countries with treaties with the
United States, treaty provisions ensure that treaty benefits are
claimed only by residents of the treaty partner countries.

itself be read as evidence that many foreign investors are
evading home country taxation by using tax havens. But
how do we take this fact into account? The current debate
concerning section 892 is centered on whether U.S. tax
law confers a tax advantage on SWFs relative to private
investors and thereby distorts competition. Should we
assume that the policy goal is to ensure that SWFs enjoy
no tax advantage over foreign investors who have successfully avoided paying home country taxes that are
legally due, on the ground that those investors may
represent a significant portion of the totality of foreign
investors investing in the United States? Or should we
only aim to ensure that SWFs enjoy no tax advantage
over foreign investors who abide by their home countries’ tax laws, even supposing that those investors
represent a minority?
We need not dwell on the ethical dimension of those
questions to see their importance: The evasion of home
country tax creates an important complication for any
analysis of competitiveness. Consider an individual investor, E, who comes from a country that practices
worldwide taxation, but who evades paying home country tax on income from U.S. investments. It is crucial to
note that E already has an implicit tax advantage not
enjoyed by his law-abiding peers — or by an SWF from
the same country. This is the advantage E enjoys on
foreign investments relative to domestic investments: E
can manage to avoid home country tax on the former but
not the latter. By contrast, E’s law-abiding peers pay tax
on both types of investments. For them, there is no
tax-related comparative advantage associated with foreign investments. Similarly, E’s SWF counterpart is either
taxed or exempted by its home country on both foreign
and domestic investments (see the next section for further discussion), and therefore is indifferent toward the
two types of investments, from the perspective of home
country taxes. The very fact that E is investing in the
United States, in other words, implies a tax-related
comparative advantage over E’s SWF counterpart.
If E is taken as the representative case of a foreign
private investor with whom to compare SWFs, then
equalizing the U.S. tax treatment of E and his SWF
counterpart does not put them on an equal footing, but
instead preserves an illegitimate advantage E enjoys.
There are thus both ethical and analytical difficulties with
pretending that foreigners who evade their home countries’ worldwide taxation are just like foreigners from
territorial systems.
In summary, if we take foreign individual investors as
the relevant class with which to compare the tax position
of SWFs, it’s difficult to ignore the prevalence of home
country taxation among countries generating the most
portfolio debt and equity investments into the United
States. What if we take the reference class to be foreign
corporate investors? Actually, the practice of worldwide
taxation for corporate residents is also fairly widespread
among those countries generating the most investments
into the United States.14 Many countries that are credited

14
Needless to say, corporate investors can attempt to evade
home country tax just like individual investors. The same

(Footnote continued on next page.)
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with territorial systems (for example, Belgium, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) are territorial only in the narrow sense that their corporations
are exempt on foreign branch income and dividends from
subsidiaries. Foreign interest income typically is not
exempt; neither are dividends on portfolio equity.15 For
example, although France and the Netherlands exempt
dividend income from foreign subsidiaries, the exemption is conditioned on a minimum ownership percentage
of 5 percent.16 Below this threshold, home country tax is
imposed and foreign withholding taxes are creditable
under either domestic or treaty law.
Corporate investors from countries that adopt territorial systems in the narrow sense offer an interesting case
for comparison with SWFs. Suppose that those investors
use U.S. portfolio debt and equity as benchmarks for
measuring the desirability of investment options in the
United States. Because, as noted, those corporate investors are taxable in their home countries on income from
foreign portfolio debt and equity, computing the after-tax
returns on those investments will have to take into
account home country tax rates. This makes certain other
U.S. investments are attractive from a tax perspective.
Take, for example, a French investor considering acquiring 10 percent of the voting stock of a U.S. company. Not
only would dividends on that stock be exempt from
French taxation, but the tax treaty between the United
States and France reduces U.S. withholding tax on the
dividends to 5 percent. Overall, the French investor may
be much better off, from a tax perspective, in making the
‘‘strategic’’ U.S. investments rather than investing in U.S.
portfolio equity. If one assumes that an SWF is treated
equally, both in the United States and in its home country,
between strategic and portfolio U.S. equity investments,17 the French investor is then at a comparative
advantage, in terms of tax, in making strategic U.S.
investments. This is the case even though the SWF would
be subject to no tax on those investments, and even
though the U.S. tax rates represent the marginal burden
on those investments made by the French corporation.
None of the analysis above is meant to deny that there
are bona fide cases of territorial taxation in the wide

arguments as those advanced in connection with individual
investors suggest that this does not justify pretending that these
investors are subject to territorial taxation.
15
The major exception to this is Germany; since 2001, a
statutory exemption has excluded 95 percent of any foreign
dividend from a German resident corporation’s taxable income,
regardless of the ownership level in the foreign corporation.
Before January 1, 2001, these dividends were exempt only when
earned by subsidiaries in treaty partner countries and only if a
10 percent minimum holding requirement was satisfied. See
National Foreign Trade Council, ‘‘The NFTC Foreign Income
Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century, Part Two:
Relief of International Double Taxation,’’ p. 259.
16
Id. at pp. 253-254. See also BNA Portfolio 961-3rd: ‘‘Business
Operations in France,’’ VI.B.3.c.; BNA Portfolio 973-2nd: ‘‘Business Operations in the Netherlands,’’ V.K.
17
This is assumed, for example, in Knoll, ‘‘Taxation and the
Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds,’’ supra note 3.
Things of course would be different if SWFs were taxed at home
just like private firms.
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sense (that is, exemption of all foreign investment income) among countries generating investments into the
United States. Moreover, even in relation to countries that
practice worldwide taxation, U.S. tax rates on passive
investments by foreign investors may sometimes exceed
home country tax rates.18 Thus, there will be circumstances when the U.S. tax rates are determinative of the
marginal tax burden on foreigners’ U.S. investments.
However, if we leave aside the class of foreign investors
who avoid home country taxes that are legally due, those
circumstances appear limited. Those arguments support
the use of foreign private investors subject to home
country taxation on a worldwide basis as the central case
for evaluating the relative competitiveness of SWFs. This
is what Profs. Desai and Dharmapala do, and their
analysis shows that section 892 does not confer any tax
advantage on SWFs.19
In the next section, I suggest that instead of being
agnostic about whether foreign private investors are
generally subject to home country taxation on U.S. investments, we should be agnostic about whether SWFs
are generally exempt from taxation at home.

Taxability of SWFs at Home
Although Profs. Desai, Dharmapala, and Knoll all
regard home country taxation of foreign private investors’ U.S. investments as important to evaluating
whether section 892 gives SWFs a tax advantage, they are
less interested in how SWFs are taxed at home. Profs.
Desai and Dharmapala claim that ‘‘SWFs are . . . by definition, tax-exempt at home.’’20 Prof. Knoll also treats
SWFs as exempt from home country taxation, but justifies this treatment by stating that it is a simplifying
assumption and not a factual assertion. He writes:
Because SWFs are government owned and controlled, any tax they would pay at home would be
paid to the governments that own them. It, thus,
makes little sense to talk about how SWFs are taxed
in their home countries. Any such taxes are merely
transfers from one pocket controlled by the government to another pocket. Thus, such investment
funds are effectively taxed on the territorial system.
The only tax that they pay, if any, is located in the
countries where they invest.
In other words, even if SWFs are nominally taxed on
their worldwide income in their countries of residence,
that is substantively no different from exempting SWFs
from home country taxation on their foreign income.

18
This is particularly true for U.S. real estate investments that
trigger the 1980 Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act.
19
Desai and Dharmapala, supra note 6. See also Knoll, ‘‘Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds,’’ supra
note 3, Part VI, which reaches similar conclusions.
20
Desai and Dharmapala, supra note 6, at 3. In Fleischer, ‘‘A
Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth,’’ supra note 4, Prof. Fleischer neglects home country taxation of foreigners’ U.S. investments entirely, and ipso facto neglects the home country taxation
of SWFs.
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The assumption that SWFs are exempt from home
country taxation is incorrect. The China Investment Corporation (CIC) is subject to tax, as is the Korea Investment Corporation (KIC).21 Moreover, both China and
Korea tax their resident corporations’ worldwide income.22 Temasek, one of Singapore’s two SWFs, is also
subject to the corporate income tax, although Singapore
has a tax system that is territorial in the broad sense that
foreign income of residents is generally exempt from
Singaporean taxation.23 These unsystematic factual findings are conceptually unsurprising: When an SWF is not
an integral part of the government, but a separate legal
entity controlled by the government, it is an SOE. There
is no general presumption that SOEs are exempt from
income taxation, and there are many instances of taxable
SOEs all over the world.
What about Prof. Knoll’s argument that worldwide
taxation of SWFs is substantively equivalent to taxing
SWFs on a territorial basis? Implicit in that argument is
the idea that because the home country government
owns an SWF, both the government and the SWF
should be indifferent to tax payments from the SWF to
the government, on one hand, and retained earnings
that the SWF keeps, on the other. In other words, even
if SWFs are taxable at home, they should not be
sensitive to home country taxes. If this reasoning were
valid, it should apply to all SOEs. That, however,
would render it puzzling that so many countries (not
only those just named that tax their SWFs) tax their
SOEs. Why bother?
There is no need to settle the interesting matter of
why SOEs are taxed and whether taxable SOEs are tax
sensitive here.24 Instead, we can explore the implications
of two alternative assumptions: (1) that SWFs are either
not taxed like private investors from the same countries,
or, even though they are nominally taxed just like
private investors, they are tax insensitive; or (2) that
SWFs are taxed just like private investors and are

21
Article 1 of China’s Enterprise Income Tax Law (the EIT
Law) imposes the corporate income tax on all corporations as
well as other corporation-like entities regardless of ownership.
See also the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of
Taxation, ‘‘Notice Regarding Enterprise Income Tax Payments
by Experimental Enterprise Groups,’’ Caishui 119 (Nov. 6, 2008)
(listing CIC as a consolidated taxpayer). KIC’s tax status can be
found in its 2007 annual report, available at http://www.
kic.go.kr/program/kicboard/view.jsp?did=en&id=ekn020000&
no=169.
22
See article 3 of the EIT Law, supra note 21; BNA Portfolio
970-3rd: ‘‘Business Operations in the Republic of Korea,’’ Section V.B.1.
23
See
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/temasek
review/2008/Group-Income-Statements.html (Temasek’s gross
income statements); BNA Portfolio 983-3d: ‘‘Business Operations in Singapore,’’ Section IV.B.
24
In ‘‘Income Taxation of State-Owned Enterprises: Theory
and Chinese Evidence’’ (manuscript available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1410463), I argue that taxation of SOEs can
serve as a mechanism for forcing SOE distributions, in view of
the divergent interests between managers and shareholders that
characterize SOEs as well as private firms. On this theory,
taxable SOEs are generally tax sensitive.
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sensitive to home country tax. Either assumption, it
turns out, can imply that equal U.S. tax treatment of
SWFs and private investors (for example, via the repeal
of section 892) is not necessary to ensure that foreign
private investors are not disadvantaged on U.S. investments. This is, of course, a conclusion that Profs. Desai
and Dharmapala and even Prof. Knoll should be
sympathetic to; it’s the arguments offered here for the
conclusion that are new.
Consider first an SWF that is categorically exempt
from taxation by its home country. Using this example, as
well as the additional assumption that SWFs are exempt
from source country taxation in countries other than the
United States,25 Profs. Desai and Dharmapala argue that
if section 892 is repealed, the SWF would be put at a
comparative disadvantage on U.S. investments relative to
a private investor subject to worldwide taxation by its
home country. The same conclusion can be derived using
a different assumption, namely that SWFs and private
investors both have the option of investing either domestically or abroad. If the SWF is subject to any U.S. tax on
U.S. investments, it would pay more tax on a U.S.
investment than on any domestic investment. This constitutes a comparative disadvantage relative to taxable
foreign investors on U.S. investments: Under either
worldwide or territorial taxation, taxable foreign investors generally do not bear more tax on U.S. investments
than they bear on any domestic investment (assuming
lower source country tax rates for nonresidents than
home country tax rates for residents). In other words, the
tax-exemption of SWFs at home could actually systematically disadvantage them on foreign investments, if
both they and private investors are subject to source
country taxation.
The same logic applies to an SWF that is indifferent
about any home country tax it has to pay. Domestic and
foreign taxes hurt private investors the same way. If, on
the other hand, the SWF is sensitive only to foreign taxes
but is indifferent to home country tax, it suffers a
comparative disadvantage on foreign investments if any
foreign tax is imposed.
While previous authors have compared the different
U.S. investment options open to foreign government and
private investors, as well as the choice between investing
in the United States and other countries outside the
investor’s home country, they do not compare SWFs and
private investors in terms of the option, which both may
have, of staying home and investing domestically.26 Yet

25
This assumption may seem too strong. Many countries do
not offer section 892-like treatment to sovereign investors. See
JCT report, supra note 1, Appendix One.
26
See Knoll, ‘‘Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign
Wealth Funds,’’ supra note 3, at note 123, for a justification for
‘‘ignoring the possibility of non-US investors making investments in their home countries.’’ This approach, however, is in
tension with two facts: the ‘‘home-bias’’ in international investment decisions observed in many countries, and the fact that
many of the countries generating the largest amount of investment in the United States, for example, Canada, China, France,
Germany, Japan, the U.K., etc., are very large economies themselves.
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that possibility is both logically and factually important.
CIC and Temasek, as well as several other SWFs, all make
both domestic and foreign investments.27 And it would
not be surprising if the performance of those funds is
measured on the basis of their mixed portfolios comprising both domestic and foreign assets. In those cases, the
supposition that SWFs have some kind of special tax
status at home (being untaxed or tax-insensitive) implies
a tax disadvantage, relative to private investors, on
foreign investments subject to foreign tax. Because of this,
section 892 may actually have an equalizing effect, as
opposed to the opposite.
Finally, consider the case of an SWF that is taxed at
home just like private investors from the same country
and, moreover, is sensitive to any home country tax. If the
SWF comes from a country practicing worldwide taxation, then U.S. tax rates generally fail to determine the
marginal tax burden on its U.S. investments just as they
do for private investors from the same country (section
892 provides a pleasant but unnecessary benefit). If the
SWF comes from a country practicing territorial taxation
in the narrow sense (à la France), then on portfolio debt
and equity, the SWF is on equal footing with private
investors from the same country (both being subject to
home country taxation), but may derive an advantage
from section 892 concerning strategic equity investments
and some real estate investments. Finally, if the SWF
comes from a country practicing territorial taxation in the
broad sense (à la Singapore), then SWFs may be advantaged by virtue of section 892, regarding a wider class of
investments (for example, possibly portfolio equity). In
short, the practices of home countries matter to the
evaluation of the effect of section 892 as much because
they apply to SWFs as because they apply to private
investors.
In the last section, we argued that, methodologically, it
may be sounder to treat the foreign private investors with
whom SWFs compete as taxed at home on a worldwide
basis. Not only is that approach more consistent with the
laws of the countries actually generating private investment in the United States, but noncompliance with such
laws (that is, when foreigners evade home country taxation) is also analytically significant for evaluating the
competitiveness of SWFs and private investors. Similarly,
in this section, we have argued that the taxation of SWFs
in their home countries cannot always be ignored. This is
not only because there are important instances of home
country taxation of SWFs, but also because the assumption that SWFs are not taxed in their home countries or
are insensitive to home country tax is not an innocuous
simplification, but can itself be analytically significant for
evaluating competitiveness.28

27
This appears to be the case, for example, with the Kuwait
and Qatar Investment Authorities. The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, by contrast, invests only
abroad. The Government Pension Fund of Norway offers another variation: It comprises two separate funds, one investing
in Norway and the other investing globally.
28
Another technical reason why SWFs may be taxed at home
is the following. As the NYSBA report, supra note 1, pp. 33-34,

From the discussion so far, we have uncovered several
nontrivial instances — there are no doubt more — in
which equal U.S. tax treatment of SWFs and foreign
private investors (for example, via the repeal of section
892) would put the former at a tax-induced disadvantage
instead of equalizing the two. In the next and final
section, we question whether, even granting the importance of evaluating the effect of taxation on the competitiveness of SWFs and private investors, focusing on
section 892 is a fruitful way of doing so.

Section 892: The Wrong Place to Look?
Although we should be careful about assuming that
SWFs are necessarily exempt from home country taxation, that assumption may be more straightforward regarding another (more long-standing) class of section 892
beneficiaries: foreign government-sponsored pension
funds. The recent communications from the Canada
Pension Plan Investment Board and the Pension Investment Association of Canada29 to the U.S. Department of
Treasury concerning the possible contravention of section
892 by Notice 2007-55, 2007-27 IRB 13, Doc 2007-14105,
2007 TNT 115-12, serve as a timely reminder of the
importance of this group of investors. The recent discussions of section 892 in the context of the SWF debate have
tended to conflate section 892 investors with SWFs,30 but
there are obvious and important differences between
SWFs and foreign public pension funds. For example,
although the latter have been making U.S. investments
for a long time, there has been little concern, relative to
the concern expressed regarding SWFs, that the management of such funds may be subject to political interference by their sponsoring governments. This different
perception of foreign pension funds may also be because,
historically, they have rarely made the kind of strategic
equity investments in U.S. companies as SWFs were
making during 2007 and 2008.
Some scholars have also highlighted another difference among public pension funds and SWFs: The former
have well-defined liabilities, that is, pension obligations
to retirees, with which investments should (at least in
theory) be matched, whereas the latter ‘‘lack stated or

discusses, to cope with the ‘‘all or nothing’’ nature of the U.S. tax
law requirement that claimants of section 892 benefits must not
engage in ‘‘commercial activities,’’ section 892 investors often
set up subsidiary ‘‘blocker corporations’’ to hold investments
that might be suspected of constituting commercial activities.
Often, it is these subsidiary holding companies that are the
actual claimants of section 892 benefits. Even if the parent SWF
is tax exempt, it’s not always clear that its multiple subsidiary
companies are.
29
See ‘‘Canada’s Pension Investment Board Comments on
Guidance on Distributions Between Foreign Governments,
REITs,’’ Oct. 28, 2008, Doc 2008-23437, 2008 TNT 215-10; ‘‘Canadian Pension Association Criticizes Guidance on Distributions
Between Foreign Governments, REITs,’’ Nov. 14, 2008, Doc
2008-27029, 2008 TNT 248-20 (hereinafter the PIAC letter).
30
For instance, Prof. Fleischer speaks of ‘‘sovereign investors’’ interchangeably with SWFs. See generally Fleischer, ‘‘A
Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth,’’ supra note 4.
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specified liability profiles.’’31 To put it differently, unlike
public pension funds, SWFs do not have obvious distribution requirements.32
Keeping these differences between public pension
funds and SWFs in mind, consider the similarities between SWFs and another group of potential foreign
investors in the U.S.: foreign commercial SOEs. Foreign
SOEs, when they invest in the United States, make
strategic or direct acquisitions, as well as portfolio investments. Those large investments have in the past provoked political responses in America similar to that
provoked by the recent spate of SWF acquisitions,33
largely because of suspicion of political interference in
SOE management. Moreover, SOEs that are fully government owned may also lack well-defined distribution
requirements. Despite those similarities between SWFs
and commercial SOEs, the latter are not eligible for
section 892 benefits.34
The contrasts between SWFs and government pension
funds, as well as the similarities between SWFs and
commercial SOEs, raise the question: Is focus on section
892 a poor way for framing any tax policy issue raised by
SWFs? The following four considerations suggest that the
answer is indeed yes.
First, both this article and others have identified
several circumstances in which, if section 892 were to be
repealed, the would-be claimant of section 892 benefits
would be disadvantaged on U.S. investments relative to
foreign private investors, rather than being put on an
equal footing with the latter. Those circumstances include
(but are not limited to): (1) the government investor (G)
has the option of investing in other foreign countries free
of both source and resident country taxation, and is
competing with a private investor (W) taxed at home on
a worldwide basis35; (2) G has the option of staying at
home and investing domestically with tax exemption and

31
Olivia S. Mitchell, John Piggott, and Cagri Kumru, ‘‘Managing Public Investment Funds: Best Practices and New Challenges,’’ NBER Working Paper 14078, available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w14078.
32
The distribution requirements of public pension funds may
help explain why they are rarely taxed in their home countries.
See, e.g., the PIAC letter, supra note 29 (Canadian pension funds,
whether in the public and private sectors, are generally tax
exempt in Canada).
33
Examples from the recent past include the proposed acquisitions of Unocal by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, and of 3M by a consortium of investors including China’s
Huawei Corporation (which is not literally state owned but is
suspected of government backing).
34
Prof. Fleischer erroneously asserts that entities ‘‘that benefit from section 892 include . . . state-owned enterprises, like
Russia’s government-controlled energy giant Gazprom.’’ Fleischer, ‘‘A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth,’’ supra note 4, at 16.
In general, government-controlled entities engaged in commercial activities are not eligible for section 892 benefits. Section
892(a)(2). Gazprom violates both this requirement and the
requirement of being wholly owned by a foreign sovereign — it
is a publicly listed company. See reg. section 1.892-2T(a)(3)(i).
35
This is the central example offered by Desai and Dharmapala, supra note 6. The repeal of section 892 would make U.S.

is competing with W36; and (3) G is tax exempt at home
but is competing with a foreign private investor who has
successfully evaded its home country’s worldwide taxation.37 While many SWFs may find themselves in those
circumstances, it is even more likely that foreign pension
funds will so find themselves. For instance, foreign
pension funds are more likely than SWFs to be investing
both domestically and globally. Thus, for those claimants
of section 892 benefits, the arguments are even stronger
that it is the repeal of section 892, and not the status quo,
that would have an unequal effect.
Second, to the extent that a tax policy response to
SWFs is thought to be required in the first place because
of the special characters of SWF investments — for
example, the geopolitical risks and negative externalities
they pose38 — a response that punishes foreign pension
funds’ investments that do not possess those characteristics clearly seems unjust. As bad as ‘‘guilty by suspicion’’ is, ‘‘guilty by association’’ is even worse.
Third, as suggested above, even with their other
characteristics put aside and considered purely as taxpayers, SWFs can be a rather mixed bunch. As a result,
the effects of both section 892 and its repeal not be
uniform. For example, given that KIC is taxed on a
worldwide basis (and supposing it is sensitive to home
country tax), whereas Temasek is subject to Singapore’s
territorial tax regime, the repeal of section 892 would
presumably hurt the latter more than the former. This
effect neither ‘‘levels the playing field’’ for the parties
affected, nor possesses any other imaginable policy justification.
Fourth, most importantly, it is a fundamental misreading of section 892 to think that eligibility for its benefits
carves out a line between public and private ownership.39
What makes this transparent is the fact that one group of
foreign investors that SWFs may compete with on U.S.
investments (especially strategic investments) are commercial SOEs. It is completely plausible, for example, to
imagine one set of bidders for the equity of a U.S. bank to
be SWFs, like the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, and
another set consisting of state-owned banks from China
or other countries. The issues for the U.S.’s national
interest raised by these competing bidders are likely to be
similar, despite their different U.S. tax treatment under
section 892. If any tax policy response is necessary to
these government-controlled foreign investors, repealing
section 892 offers no help.

investments relatively more costly for G whereas the relative
cost of U.S. investments for the private investor remains unchanged.
36
See supra text accompanying notes 32 and 33.
37
See example of individual ‘‘E’’ in Section I, p. 5, supra.
38
See supra note 4.
39
This is Prof. Fleischer’s preferred reading. See Fleischer, ‘‘A
Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth,’’ supra note 4, at 7 (‘‘there is
no compelling reason to favor state-controlled investment over
private capitalism’’) and 12 (justifying the proposal to impose an
excise tax on SWFs by its ‘‘appeal to policymakers . . . who want
to make a strong statement in favor of private capitalism over
state capitalism’’).
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In summary, while analyses of the relative competitiveness of SWFs and other foreign investors in making
U.S. investments can often be illuminating, the repeal of
section 892 as a policy response to SWF investments
seems ill-advised.
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Introduction
The problems with the current U.S. tax system are
well known. It is far too complex. It unduly distorts
economic and financial activity (for example, by treating
debt and equity finance differently). There is an
unacceptable level of tax avoidance and evasion. And
many people believe that the federal tax system is
insufficiently progressive.1
The U.S. income tax is far more complex than that of
any other country. This imposes a tremendous drain on
our economy and diverts the intelligence and efforts of
highly talented people into tax planning and compliance
— activities that do not enhance overall national welfare
and that increase the cost of doing business. It also
contributes to the unfairness of the tax system and makes
compliance difficult by subjecting taxpayers to an impenetrable thicket of rules.
The system is therefore in need of fundamental reform, which will not be easy because of entrenched
interests and technical challenges. However, the gains to
the economy from a more streamlined tax system can be
substantial. A robust tax system will also be needed to
bring the budget into balance once the economy recovers
from the current recession.
Given other priorities, fundamental tax reform does
not appear to be on the legislative agenda for 2009, but
the construction of a better tax system requires preparing
the ground now so that a plan can be ready by the time
Congress turns to the issue. This essay argues that a key
element in fashioning a tax reform strategy is the taxation
of capital gains. I don’t claim originality for these ideas;
variants of each of them have been proposed by a
number of tax policy analysts.2 Taxing capital gains at
death is not (yet) an articulated element of the Obama
administration’s tax plan, so I thought it would be
worthwhile to discuss the opportunity for progress that a
bold position on this issue would provide.

1
This is at least implicitly the position of the Obama administration, as the president has proposed undoing many of the
previous administration’s tax cuts that favored the wealthy.
2
See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, ‘‘Saving the Income Tax: An
Agenda for Research,’’ Tax Notes, Nov. 24, 1997, p. 967, Doc
97-31881, or 97 TNT 226-55.
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